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Education reform in New York City (2002-2013) 
From 2002 until 2013 the city of New York was governed by Mayor Michael 
Bloomberg who, in his first State of the City Address, immediately after taking office, stated 
that “we must fix our school system” (Bloomberg, 2002). In the years that followed, NYC’s 
education landscape changed dramatically: new forms of schooling were introduced in the 
shape of charter schools and small schools of choice; schools deemed to be failing were 
closed, often in the face of vitriolic public protest; and the structural hierarchy that permeated 
the Department of Education was reorganised and in large parts dismantled. 
This paper will focus on the policy changes that took place in NYC during 
Bloomberg’s administration, relating them to the changes in school outcomes that 
simultaneously took place within the city. Although it is difficult to show causation between 
the many policy initiatives that were introduced, it will draw links where possible. NYC’s 
education reform is remarkable in many ways – not least because for 12 years, under one 
administration, sustained and coherent reform was able to take place unimpeded by the 
changes in political leadership that often blight such processes in other democratic territories.  
The education system in NYC is of particular global interest: all public schools are 
overseen by one administration body (the NYC Department of Education (DOE)), which is 
the largest school system in the USA, and one of the largest in the world (Fullan & Boyle 
2014, p. 21). There are over a million students in over 1800 schools within the city (NYC 
DOE, 2015a). Urban centres across the US (Rotherham & Whitmire, 2014; Kelleher, 2014), 
and the globe (Elwick & McAleavy, 2015), have learnt from the lessons of NYC and will 
undoubtedly continue to do so based upon the remarkable improvement in student outcomes 
that accompanied the Bloomberg reform programme. 
Upon election, Bloomberg made taking control of the city’s education system a 
priority – angling for increased authority in his inaugural address (McGinley, 2010, p. 306). 
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By June 2002 the State Assembly and Senate of New York passed a bill granting mayoral 
control over the city’s schools, a decision that was reauthorized in 2009 and meant that 
Bloomberg was able to effect change in NYC’s public school system more directly than any 
mayor of the city since at least 1969 (McGlynn, 2010, p. 294). This was key, both for the 
depth and also breadth of reforms that took place – freeing Bloomberg, and subsequently his 
school chancellors, from much (although certainly not all) of the bureaucracy that he blamed 
for the “inertia and resistance” that stood in the way of school reform (Bloomberg, 2002). 
This paper uses a mixed methods approach, based on an analysis of secondary 
literature and data relating to the NYC school system between 2002 and 2013 and a series of 
qualitative interviews. It will not present a blow-by-blow account of the reform strategies 
adopted as these already largely exist (e.g. Klein, 2014; O’Day et al., 2011), but will instead 
consider what the key measures were in terms of their ultimate aim – improving student 
outcomes – and how these worked together. In order to do this, eight ‘key witnesses’ were 
interviewed, comprising those working at policy level (e.g. city and state education 
department officials), those working at school level (e.g. school principals) and academics 
working within the city who had particular insights. A condition of these interviews was that 
the participants would remain anonymous – allowing them to freely speak their minds 
regards what they believed had been the extent of the changes in NYC and which measures 
had been particularly successful (or unsuccessful). The secondary data analysis uses a variety 
of sources, including both academic papers and media/press reports from the period in order 
to contextualise the study. Quantitative data is used to understand the changes in student 
outcomes, based upon publically available datasets from the NYC DOE as well as the New 
York State Education Department, and the US National Center for Education Statistics. 
While this paper will focus on the reforms that took place in NYC, the changes 
enacted in the city were almost all built upon evidence of success elsewhere in the world and 
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should be judged within the framework of wider international school reforms. After 
considering the quantitative evidence related to student outcomes in NYC, this paper will 
look at four areas of reform in particular, and will preface each by providing a short 
contextual summary of the wider evidence base. 
Student outcomes 
In order to judge the effects of reform in NYC, it is first important to look at the 
quantitative data around student outcomes, not entirely straightforward given the multiplicity 
of measures by which students are judged, as well as the fact that curriculum and assessment 
changes in New York and the US make it difficult to compare directly across the whole time 
period. In terms of a headline statistic however, I will first look at high school graduation 
rates – a nationwide measure which shows one of the most impressive improvements in NYC. 
In Figure 1 it is possible to see that for ten years prior to 2002 there had been a 
stagnation in graduation rates in NYC, with virtually no long-term change in the percentage 
of students leaving school with a diploma (and that figure a depressing 50 per cent). Between 
2002 and 2014 this rate increased, year-on-year, to reach almost three-quarters by the time 
Bloomberg left office at the end of his third term. At the same time, the percentage of 
students dropping-out of school decreased, from 20.0 per cent in 2003 to 13.5 per cent in 
2014 (NYC DOE, 2014). 
Using a different metric, the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), it 
is possible to compare NYC with other similar urban centres, and also with the wider state of 
New York. In the case of the former, NYC performs extremely well when stood up against 14 
similar cities serving high-needs groups (Figure 2). Almost 80 per cent of NYC’s students 
qualify for free or reduced-cost lunches (based upon their levels of poverty) (NYC DOE, 
2015b) which makes such a comparison particularly useful given the weight of research 
which shows a link between disadvantage and poor performance at school (e.g. OECD, 2013). 
Figure 1 
Figure 2 
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Wong and Farris showed that on the NAEP assessment NYC made measurable 
progress on narrowing the achievement gap (for low-income students) (Wong & Farris, 2011, 
p. 230), although it should be noted that NYC’s scores nonetheless fall well behind national 
averages on these tests (Disare, 2015). In contrast to NYC, only around 53 per cent of 
students in New York State as a whole are classified as economically disadvantaged (NYSED, 
2015). Although New York State comfortably outperforms NYC on the NAEP tests, the city 
has improved at a much greater rate during the period 2003-2013 than either the state or the 
country as a whole (NYC DOE, 2013). 
State-specific tests of maths and English show more of a mixed picture for NYC: the 
percentage of proficient students in the city rose steadily between 2006 and 2009, but then 
dropped significantly when the ‘cut score’ (the level at which proficiency was deemed) 
changed. The results then began to rise again, until 2013 when the exam was altered to reflect 
the new ‘Common Core’ curriculum – at which point proficiency rates dropped once more 
(NYC DOE, 2014b). 
Reform one: leadership 
Improving school leadership is a policy priority around the world (Pont et al. 2008); 
with evidence that, although not enough in isolation, effective leadership can lead to 
improved outcomes for students (see Day et al. 2016). Hallinger and Heck’s review of 
research in 1998 included studies from as far back as 1980, and led them to conclude that 
principals did have a measurable effect on school effectiveness and student achievement,  
Leadership reforms in NYC operated on two levels. Firstly Bloomberg made what 
were considered outlandish appointments at the very top of the DOE, installing political 
leaders with whom he would be able to work together – driving reform in the direction he had 
promised upon election. Secondly he addressed what he saw as a great injustice of the system 
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at school level: giving much greater freedom and authority to school leaders (principals) – in 
exchange for making them more directly accountable to the DOE. 
In August 2002 Bloomberg appointed Joel Klein as NYC School Chancellor, Klein 
was a lawyer with no formal experience in the education sector and yet he had been given the 
most senior education position in the city. Together Bloomberg and Klein began to exert 
greater control over the system: “first centralizing authority to eliminate layers of red tape 
and establish citywide norms, and then devolving greater authority to school principals in 
exchange for greater accountability for the academic performance of their students” (Kelleher, 
2014, p. 19). These changes, and the wider reform programme, were known as ‘Children 
First’ and, according to Klein, were driven by a “philosophy of change” (Klein 2014, p. 22). 
Change was pursued relentlessly by those in power. Eli Broad, when awarding NYC the 
Broad Prize in 2007,1 said that in NYC “the strong leadership by the mayor, the chancellor, 
and a progressive teachers’ union has allowed the nation’s largest school system to 
dramatically improve student outcomes” (Medina, 2007). 
Two of the former senior officials interviewed as part of this research both 
commented on the important role that political leadership and support provided to the reforms: 
“Now we spent a lot of time, both at the mayor’s level and my level, working with 
politicians, keeping them onside, sometimes you’d have to negotiate, sometimes 
you’d push harder than they might have liked” (former senior official at the NYC 
DOE). 
“[Political support] is essential – the fact that the mayor was supportive, was willing 
to accept responsibility for public education in a way that previous mayors had not” 
(former senior official at the NYC DOE). 
                                                          
1 “Awarded each year to honor urban school districts that demonstrate the greatest overall performance and 
improvement in student achievement while reducing achievement gaps among low-income students and 
students of color” (The Broad Foundation, 2015). 
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At the school level, there is considerable evidence that school leaders play a central 
role in the success of high-performing systems (e.g. Slater, 2013). This was a view shared by 
Joel Klein in NYC, who described principals as: a “crucial piece in the education puzzle”; 
“key agents of reform”; and “the most important” factor in system-wide success (Klein, 2014, 
p. 61 & 184). This view was shared by many of those interviewed as part of this research: 
“The principal is the key leverage point in a large urban school district. And getting 
the best people you can find, supporting them, developing them [is crucial]” (former 
senior official in the NYC DOE). 
“I think if you don’t have really good, strong principals, your schools are just not 
going to work well” (former senior official in the NYC DOE). 
“I don’t think you can have a successful system without successful schools and you 
can’t have successful schools without strong principals” (academic and former special 
assistant to the chancellor). 
The Department of Education adopted a policy of decentralisation in order to make 
best use of these key agents. Eric Nadelstern, a member of Klein’s senior team at the DOE 
suggested that “the more authority you share, the more influential you become” (Nadelstern, 
2013, p. 18) and this view permeated the reforms that directly targeted school principals. The 
‘Autonomy Zone’ (at first an opt-in pilot scheme, gradually rolled out to all schools) 
represented this increase in autonomy for school leaders, decentralising support networks and 
giving principals the choice of who they could affiliate to and buy support from, based upon 
their individual circumstances (Kelleher, 2014, p. 15). 
Klein’s retrospective view was that the principals went from being “the weakest 
players in the whole system” to become a positive force for improvement as they were 
gradually given greater control over their staff and their budget (Klein, 2014, p. 41). Klein’s 
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background as a CEO may well have played a large part in his desire for principals to 
essentially become CEOs themselves (Rogers, 2009, p. 23). As a former DOE official said: 
“They need the right to recruit, they need supports and they ultimately need the right 
to terminate teachers. You can talk about fair processes and all that, but controlling 
your human resources is number one. Number two, controlling your budget” (former 
senior official in the NYC DOE). 
The same official then explained how a lack of autonomy in certain areas restricted 
decision-making in others: 
“A simple example. People would say let’s all have 22 to one class size. And so if 
you’re a principal meeting that requirement may mean you end up with virtually no 
discretionary funds. Let’s say you wanted to do an intervention program for 
struggling readers. And I was much more of the view: give principals budget based on 
a fair allocation formula and then let them decide. Give them control over their 
budgets” (former senior official in the NYC DOE). 
As well as directly changing the level of authority and decision-making power that 
principals could exercise, the professionalization of school leaders was also addressed under 
Klein and Bloomberg. The NYC Leadership Academy was initiated, which would allow 
principals to make best use of their new-found freedoms.  
The academy served multiple ends: “the initiative served to create a cadre of leaders 
loyal to the chancellor and his efforts to place children first… it also served as something of a 
wake-up call for those who directed university principal preparation programs that the future 
was not what it used to be” (Nadelstern, 2013, p. 7). Many of the candidates for the academy 
came directly from the school system, having previously been effective teachers (Nadelstern, 
2013, p. 8). According to one of the officials interviewed the programme centred on: 
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“Solution driven training... how you deal with budget, how you deal with angry 
parents, how you get teachers who are resistant aligned with your mission, etc.” 
(former senior official in the city education department). 
By 2009, 15 percent of the total number of principals working in NYC had graduated 
through the Leadership Academy’s ‘Aspiring Principals Programme.’ It should be noted that 
analysis by Gootman and Gebeloff has shown that the schools they were working in were less 
likely to perform well according to the city’s own report cards (Gootman & Gebeloff, 2009) –
however this may have been down to the fact they were less experienced than their 
counterpats, having only recently become principals. 
Strong and effective leadership, both politically and at the school level, is often cited 
as one of the key factors in terms of wider school improvement at a system level (e.g. 
Leithwood et al., 2006). It is no surprise, therefore, that Bloomberg focused on this area as 
one of his major reforms during the 2000s. Although it is very difficult to quantify the effect 
that this had, it did underpin much of the broader reform programme during the period. 
Reform two: accountability alongside autonomy 
The combination of increasing both school autonomy and accountability is bound up 
in within the concept of self-managed schools, first proposed by Caldwell and Spinks in 1988 
and subsequently built upon in a range of contexts, including in England (e.g. Hargreaves 
2014; Gilbert 2012) and across the Asia-Pacific region (e.g. Caldwell 2003). In NYC, as well 
as giving school leaders more power, the deal that Klein and Bloomberg made with the 
principals was also based upon an increased level of accountability. All of the principals who 
signed up to the pilot Autonomy Zone “had a performance contract with the city” (former 
senior official in the NYC DOE); school inspections by external experts, known as ‘quality 
reviews,’ were introduced; and each school received a graded progress report based upon 
variables including school environment, student performance and progress (Kelleher, 2014, p. 
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22). This series of policies was designed to retain the DOE’s role in accountability, while still 
allowing schools and principals the greater freedoms that the administration saw as key to 
school improvement: 
“What we were attempting to do was create networks that were autonomous as well 
and that loosely orbited the Department of Education for accountability purposes only” 
(former senior official at the NYC DOE). 
Schools were benchmarked against each other, with data used to compare like-for-like 
schools based on their intakes (Nadelstern, 2013, p. 21). This allowed for a fair comparison 
between schools faced with similar challenges and echoed similar policy initiatives in 
London (Baars et al., 2014) and Rio de Janeiro (Elwick & McAleavy, 2015). As an 
interviewee noted, the move was akin to comparing:  
“Apples to apples on performance – meaning we didn’t compare principals in high-
poverty communities with principals in middle-income communities. We looked at 
comparable schools; we measured progress as the key variable” (former senior 
official in NYC DOE). 
According to Klein, for the first time in NYC “people were getting information about 
kids and using it to help them improve” (Klein, 2014, p. 201). 
The appointment of Jim Liebman to the role of chief accountability officer at the DOE 
accelerated the development of this new accountability regime: providing a greater range of 
data on individual schools, both in terms of progress and ‘quality’ – judged through the 
inspection visits which looked at leadership, classroom instruction, teacher practice and staff 
use of data to inform instruction (Nadelstern, 2013, p. 22). 
As well as this move towards centralised accountability – from the principals to the 
DOE – there was also a layer of accountability created between the principals and the support 
networks that they could choose to utilise (as part of their newly-granted autonomy). In an 
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expansion of his Autonomy Zone, Klein introduced two measures that school principals 
could look to for support. School Support Organisations (SSOs) directly provided support 
services and principals could choose from which of these organisations they purchased their 
services (at first there were 11 of these, then consolidated down to five) (Shipps, 2012). 
Schools were then able to affiliate to a network of other schools, known as Children First 
Networks (CFNs) (Wohlstetter et al., 2013) for school-to-school support and to deal with the 
SSOs as a consortium. The market-place that Klein created meant that principals could 
essentially vote with their feet, abandoning poorly-performing SSOs or switching their 
affiliation if they thought they could get more elsewhere. 
The combination of enhanced autonomy and accountability during the 2000s in NYC 
in many ways echoes a body of literature that has developed in the UK around the concept of 
the self-improving school system (e.g. Hargreaves, 2010).  Christine Gilbert (who played a 
key role in the transformation of London’s schools during the 2000s (Baars et al., 2014)) 
believed that “accountability in its broadest sense provides important support for school 
improvement and is more critical than ever as we move to establish a truly self-improving 
system” (Gilbert, 2012, p. 4). This line of argument was undoubtedly bound up in 
Klein/Bloomberg’s thinking, along with the fact that Bloomberg explicitly made himself 
accountable to the public on education (Ravitch, 2003), and hence needed to maintain a close 
eye on the performance of individual schools within the system.  
Reform three: structures & schools 
Introducing new forms of government-funded school, increasing choice and 
competition within school systems, is often referred to as the marketization, or quasi-
marketization, of a system (e.g. Walford 2000). Such approaches have been adopted since at 
least the late 1980s, when the first City Technology Colleges began opening in England 
(Whitty et al. 1998), followed by charter schools in the USA in 1992 (West & Bailey 2013).  
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This widespread introduction of quasi-markets has gradually altered the landscape of schools 
and school structures, particularly in industrialised countries (Walford 2000), with changes 
often explicitly intended to improve the educational outcomes of pupils from deprived inner-
city areas (West & Bailey 2013). 
On a structural level Bloomberg and Klein initiated a period of increased 
centralisation in NYC, removing layers of bureaucracy from the system, which later enabled 
them to devolve authority and responsibility more easily to the school principals (as 
previously discussed). Schools in the city had previously been accountable to district 
superintendents (Nadelstern, 2013, p. 15) and community school boards – a “top-down 
structure where superintendents could dictate a school’s approach, even if it wasn’t in the 
best interests of students” (Gonen, 2015). These powerful hierarchies were replaced with 10 
regional offices, directly accountable to the chancellor, and with much less authority and 
power than their predecessors (Fullan & Boyle, 2014, p. 27).   
Such changes were contested: Randi Weingarten, president of the United Federation 
of Teachers (UFT) asked in 2007 “how many more of these restructurings must we go 
through?” (Gonzalez, 2007)  and in his analysis of school reform in NYC, Michael Fullan 
suggested that wider reforms in NYC were not entirely effective because of the overarching 
emphasis on structural issues rather than the deeper cultural issues: “restructuring has 
prevailed over reculturing” (Fullan & Boyle, 2014, p. 58). A school principal, interviewed as 
part of this research criticised the lack of clarity brought about through change: 
“When the mayor changed the power structur… there were other people who were 
almost lateral people who were your supervisors who you had to report to. In that, it 
created almost a sort of combative situation between people – ‘Who am I actually 
reporting to and why am I reporting to someone who is less senior to me?’” (school 
principal). 
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As well as changing the higher-level structures into which schools reported, there 
followed significant changes to the structure of schools themselves. In perhaps the most 
radical reform of all (and certainly the one that drew the fiercest criticism (NYC Public 
School Parents, 2012)), Klein and Bloomberg identified underperforming schools and set 
about closing them. Aided by the accountability measures put in place by the DOE it became 
relatively straightforward to isolate the worst-performing institutions (based on the quality 
reviews, progress reports and feedback from teachers and parents) (Nadlestern, 2013, p. 22). 
Klein claimed that “at least 10 per cent [of schools] were chronically underperforming” 
(Klein, 2014, p. 78) – in all over 160 of NYC’s public schools closed their doors at the behest 
of Bloomberg/Klein (Fertig, 2014), most of which were large high schools in disadvantaged 
areas. In order to maintain a supply of school places, the closed schools were replaced with a 
greater number of smaller schools, often co-located in the same buildings. These new schools 
were known as ‘small schools of choice’ (SSCs). 
According to Eric Nadelstern (a member of the DOE administration) “the creation of 
a critical mass of new small schools was the single most important breakthrough strategy of 
the Klein administration” (Nadlestern, 2013, p. 33). More objectively, the evidence around 
pupil outcomes at these SSCs shows that they tend to outperform comparable schools. As a 
result of NYCs lottery system of place allocation (“a universal choice system that no longer 
tied students to local communities [but] allowed them access to any high school in the city” 
according to one of the interviewees) attendance at these schools was randomised and as such 
it is possible to make comparisons between students at SSCs and those at other district-run 
schools. As can be seen in Table 1, graduation rates in the SSCs were significantly higher and 
they “continue[d] to markedly increase high school graduation rates for large numbers of 
disadvantaged students of colour, even as graduation rates [were] rising at the schools with 
Table 1 
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which SSCs are compared,” as were scores on the English Regents exam (Bloom & 
Unterman, 2013, p. 11). 2 
These newly created SSCs were entirely new organisations, with new bodies of staff, 
which was a key component in their success according to those interviewed: 
“So the new schools really were entirely new organisations, which I think makes a 
real difference in terms of preserving the model and implementing it in a way that was 
distinct from the larger factory-style high schools” (former special adviser to the 
chancellor). 
These schools were phased in slowly, admitting one grade at a time, which allowed 
them to ramp up to full capacity over a number of years (Klein, 2014, p. 78). The basic 
structural nature of these SSCs allowed them to succeed according to the interviewees:  
“The first reason is they’re simply easier to manage. It’s very difficult to find people 
who can effectively manage a school of 5,000. It’s much easier to find someone who 
can manage a school of 500... Whereas, if you have 400–500 kids in a school, then 
you have 20–25 teachers and they each have 20–25 kids in a class and that strikes me 
as the right ratio” (former senior official in the NYC DOE). 
“Get rid of the lowest-performing schools, create new ones that were mission-driven, 
working at a scale that made it more feasible to address the needs of individual kids 
and then opening up the options for kids to be able to pick the places that were going 
to be the best fit for them and their families” (academic). 
As well as creating SSCs (which were district-run schools) Klein and Bloomberg 
encouraged charter school organisations to open new schools in the city, further increasing 
choice and competition. Charter schools are public schools (free to attend) that have greater 
                                                          
2 The Regents exams are an end-of-high-school test in which a score of 75 or more is used to indicate college 
readiness 
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freedom to innovate (National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, 2015) as they are often 
supported by private financial backers and are not controlled by traditional school boards. 
Charter schools are spread across the USA, and have achieved mixed results in 
general (National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, 2015) and often been criticised for 
robbing public schools of their most promising students (Winters, 2012), however those in 
NYC do seem to perform better overall than their district school counterparts. As can be seen 
from Figures 3 and 4, the percentage of students proficient (achieving levels 3 or 4) in charter 
schools was virtually the same in English, and significantly higher in maths than at other 
district-run schools. 
A 2013 study by Stanford University’s Centre for Research on Education Outcomes 
(CREDO) showed that “on average, students in New York City charter schools learned 
significantly more than their virtual counterparts in reading and mathematics” (CREDO, 2013, 
p. 14), a finding repeated in their 2015 work (CREDO, 2015). Furthermore, Winter’s 2012 
study identified some evidence that “increases in the attrition to charter schools from 
traditional New York City public schools has small but positive effects on the academic 
proficiency of students who remain in public schools” (Winters, 2012, p. 301), thus showing 
the benefits charter schools can have on the whole system.  
Diane Ravitch has identified instances where charter schools serve different 
populations from those of their district-run counterparts, which might explain some of the 
difference in performance when comparisons are drawn within individual areas (Ravitch, 
2012); however it would not account for CREDO’s findings, above, which pair individual 
students using the NYC lottery-system of school place allocation. In addition, the 2015 
CREDO study suggested that charter schools and district-run schools (across the city as a 
whole) served similar populations in terms of special education needs and poverty (see Table 
2). 
Figures 3 
& 4 
Table 2 
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By 2013 there were 183 charter schools and 337 SSCs in NYC (Kelleher, 2014, p. 
27–8) (out of approximately 1800 schools in total, i.e. around a quarter (NYC DOE, 2015a)) 
significantly contributing to NYC’s improved pupil outcomes. The structural changes 
radically altered NYC’s education landscape, but the evidence that exists suggests they did so 
for the better. 
Reform four: teachers 
 Contemporary evidence suggests that the single biggest driver of improved school 
effectiveness is improved teaching (Ko & Sammons, 2013). From a policy perspective 
changing the teaching (or the teachers) is sometimes viewed as an attractive, potentially low-
cost option (although this depends a great deal on context). Coe et al. outline some of the 
myriad techniques, styles or approaches that underpin ‘great teaching’ in their 2014 summary 
of evidence. Accordingly, Joel Klein believed that “the biggest factor in the education 
equation [was] teachers” and the fourth area of reform in NYC centred on further 
professionalizing the teaching profession while removing poorly performing teachers from 
the system (Klein, 2014, p. 189).  
 As can be seen in Figure 5, there is evidence that the quality of teachers recruited to 
the profession in NYC did improve during the 2000s (in terms of their own academic ability): 
“In 1999, 43 percent of individuals hired to teach in NYC are drawn from the bottom 
third of the SAT distribution; by 2010, 24 percent are. In 1999, 21 percent of novice 
NYC teachers have SAT scores in the top third; by 2010 this figure increases to 40 
percent” (Lankford et al., 2014, p. 28). 
 This view was backed up by a school principal interviewed, who noted that the 
“criteria to become a teacher have got more rigorous – which is good” and that the majority 
of teachers in NYC were “people who are trying to look for the best methods to convey the 
information to the students.” A former adviser to the chancellor suggested that this 
Figure 5 
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improvement in standards was partly down to the increased autonomy provided to principals, 
which allowed them to make: 
“More strategic and detailed decisions about how the funding that they have is going 
to be used… so they can decide on the mix of teachers within their building to make 
sure they are able to attract high quality teachers but at a decent price” (former special 
assistant to the chancellor). 
 Although Klein and Bloomberg had success in terms of improving standards through 
new recruits to the profession – which in turn helped contribute to increased 
professionalization of the workforce – they had less success in removing those teachers that 
they deemed to be poor. Klein blamed the previously deep-rooted dysfunction within NYC 
schools on the stranglehold teaching unions held over the administration (Klein, 2014). 
Indeed, objectively some of the practices within staffing did seem counterintuitive (in terms 
of obtaining the best outcomes for students): prior to the changes in NYC there was a 
requirement that teachers had to be appointed based on seniority and not ability – with more 
senior staff automatically getting jobs at the expense of their junior colleagues, regardless of 
the wish of the appointing school/principal; after three years’ service teachers automatically 
received tenure, which made it harder to remove them unless they committed gross 
misconduct; and principals lacked the autonomy to make appointments, particularly in terms 
of their senior staff/assistant principals. Teachers awaiting disciplinary hearings were sent to 
‘reassignment centres’ (notoriously known as ‘rubber rooms’) where they were prevented 
from teaching, but still received their full salary. Although the arbitration process was 
streamlined, it often took years to remove incompetent teachers from the system (Freedman, 
2007; Kugler, 2010). 
 One of Klein’s stated regrets during his time at the helm of NYC’s education system 
was that he was unable to properly communicate with the teachers, owing to union 
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regulations: “I just wish I had had the ability to explain to them directly what we were doing 
and why and to hear and address their reactions” (Klein, 2014, p. 196). Approval ratings for 
the NYC education administration were high from both principals and parents in 2010, 
shortly before Klein left office, however, he was dismayed by the comparatively low 
approval figures he received from teachers in the city. Unable to interact with teachers 
directly, he felt robbed of the opportunity to explain his theory of change and instead believed 
that he was judged solely through the media’s portrayal of his work (Klein, 2014). 
 A senior official in the DOE stated that: “the most important relationship in a school 
district is between kids and teachers and everyone and everything external to schools ought to 
exist in support of that relationship.” Klein made it a priority to do just that, but was 
hampered by the role of the unions, who felt that they were protecting the interests of their 
members. Nonetheless, the administration established new pathways for training teachers, 
opened up the market for hiring teachers and transferring them and instituted pay increased 
and a limited system of performance-related pay in order to attract the best applicants 
(Kelleher, 2014, p. 42) – borne out by the increase in academic ability of those newly 
entering the profession. 
Discussion 
Reforms in NYC did not happen in isolation, but rather the four themes identified in 
this paper outline how the broader picture of change happened holistically: it is not possible 
to understand system reform purely in the context of one without the others. A focus on 
improved leadership, both at the top (system/political) level and at the level of school 
principals, underpinned the approach. Firstly, the consistency of system leadership meant that 
change was sustained; as Michael Barber puts it “persistence will be rewarded ultimately” 
(Barber, 2013). Secondly, by granting school principals greater autonomy, Bloomberg 
empowered these critical players in the system, allowing them to make key decisions over 
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staffing and over opportunistic learning costs, both of which are cited by Hattie as features of 
higher-achieving countries in international tests (Hattie, 2015a). 
Autonomy was accompanied (directly in the form of the contracts Klein/Bloomberg 
made with those who signed up to the pilot Autonomy Zone, and then later with all principals) 
by accountability – allowing the DOE to identify the weakest performing schools and to step 
in where necessary. This was important personally for Mayor Bloomberg given the fact he 
staked his reputation on fixing the broken school system: “if you can’t measure it, you can’t 
fix it” (Bloomberg, 2012). More concretely, Bloomberg and Klein closed schools that 
weren’t meeting the required standards and replaced them with small schools of choice, while 
simultaneously opening up the market to charter schools and focused on strengthening the 
pool of graduates entering the teaching profession, although Klein admitted that this was one 
area in which he would like to have achieved more (Klein, 2014). 
And so the reform programme encompassed leadership, teachers, and structural 
reform, underpinned by increased accountability – consistent with Hattie’s outline of 
successful education systems: 
“In the top education systems, however measured, it is the excellence of teachers, the 
support of such excellence and an open debate about the nature of growth towards 
excellence that matters. In my narrative, many teachers and school leaders are the 
heroes… The conditions – the structural aspects of schools – need to be supportive for 
the efforts to improve the progression of learners (and the expertise of teachers and 
school leaders) to succeed” (Hattie, 2015b, p. 26-27). 
If one views NYC’s education system as a simplified pyramid (see Figure 6), then the 
reform agenda targeted each level directly (other than the students). 
In some regards this model does appear extremely top-down – policy changes were 
necessarily driven by those in power and some of these changes certainly happened at the 
Figure 6 
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higher levels of this pyramid, with effects on students expected to filter down – something 
that John Hattie criticises as an ineffective approach to system reform (Hattie, 2015a). 
However, other policies were designed to create conditions for improvement which were 
more organic in nature – such as granting greater autonomy to school principals in order to 
drive improvement or improving the level of qualifications of new teachers in order to 
gradually enhance the professionalization of the workforce (and the expected impact this 
would have on teaching quality). 
The long-term impact of reform in NYC remains to be seen. Bill de Blasio was 
elected mayor in 2013, taking office in 2014, on a platform of radically different education 
policies, and in direct opposition to the Bloomberg era (Meyer, 2014). Notably he advocated 
a reduction in the expansion of charter schools, “representing unions, he has maintained a 
‘slow growth’ approach to charter schools in the city – a strong reversal from the 12 years of 
growth the charter sector experienced under Mayor Bloomberg” (Robinson, 2015) and 
criticised school closings (Meyer, 2014). Although it is too soon to gauge the impact de 
Blasio has had, he continues to announce policies which represent a departure from the 
Bloomberg/Klein school of thought (New York Post Editorial Board, 2015). Michael Barber 
has often emphasised the need to not just implement reform, but to implement irreversible 
reform: 
“Irreversibility means not being satisfied merely with an improvement in outcomes, 
but asking whether the structures and culture are in place that will guarantee the right 
trajectory of results for the foreseeable future. How can the changes be made to stick?” 
(Barber et al., 2010, p. 33) 
 In some regards, Bloomberg did put in place more permanent change: Meyer quotes 
Michelle Cahill, an education specialist who worked for Klein:  
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“Small schools is not an initiative… there are several hundred high schools now that 
are functioning in New York, and they have students and teachers and parents who 
affiliate with them and are showing tremendous results” (Cahill in Meyer, 2014). 
However it remains to be seen whether other policies, particularly those around 
autonomy and accountability, will prove to be as irreversible. Indeed, what is clear is that the 
direction of reform has decidedly changed: de Blasio does not talk about closing down failing 
schools, but instead has rebranded them as ‘community schools’ within a ‘Schools Renewal 
Program’ (Communities in Schools, 2014). 
While it is not possible to prove causation between the policy reforms during the 
period and improved outcomes (particularly graduation rates) there is clearly a strong 
correlation, and the evidence from the expert witnesses interviewed suggests a relationship 
between the reform agenda and outcomes. 
Conclusions 
After barely any change in the high school graduation rate for a period of at least ten 
years, between 2002 and 2014 the rate of students graduating high school in NYC increased 
by around half. This remarkable uplift in academic outcomes coincided with Michael 
Bloomberg’s time as mayor in NYC and suggests that the programme of education reform he 
implemented was successful. Bloomberg was elected mayor for three consecutive terms, with 
education policy often at the forefront of his approach, suggesting that voters recognised this 
improvement, even in the face of a vocal critical minority. 
Joel Klein was Bloomberg’s schools chancellor for most of the decade, and he led the 
reform effort, particularly focusing on improving equality across the city. As well as 
introducing fairer systems of funding and place allocation, policies such as encouraging 
charter schools to open were often explicitly aimed at helping disadvantaged students who 
had been historically let down by the public school system. 
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‘”I think that was one of his accomplishments. I think he managed to put together a 
system to channel dollars into schools with high need populations. I do believe that 
Joel was very much committed to social equity in education” (former special assistant 
to the chancellor). 
Klein and Bloomberg rooted out poor performance, with an aggressive policy of 
school closures matched by the opening of hundreds of new small schools which gave parents 
and students greater choice. Their reforms were based on a view that improving the quality of 
teachers and principals was an essential precondition for school improvement: 
“Whatever else we do, we need to make teaching a well-respected profession that 
attracts our best college graduates and ensures that they have the training in the 
subject area they will teach as well as in pedagogy and classroom management” 
(Klein, 2014, p. 283). 
Other urban centres might do well to consider the mixture of reforms adopted in New 
York City during the 2000s: although it was by no means an unmitigated success, there was 
significant improvement in the educational outcomes of students during the period. Few of 
the changes, on their own, can be considered to be especially unique, but the programme of 
change as a whole did appear to lead to these improved outcomes.  In particular I would 
suggest that this combined agenda of policy reform should be focused on, rather than any 
approach which is piecemeal in nature: Bloomberg and Klein initiated a raft of changes 
which worked together to address the individual contextual problems they identified, and it is 
this theory of change which brought about the upturn in fortunes for NYC’s schools.  
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Figure 1: Graduation rates in NYC (%), 1992-2014, using the ‘traditional method’ (NYC 
DOE, 2014). 
Figure 2: Percentage of students proficient on the NAEP in 15 different urban centres (NYC 
DOE, 2013). 
Figures 3: 
Percentage of students scoring levels1-4 (Grades 3-8) in maths (NYC Charter School Center, 
2014). 
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Figures 4: Percentage of students scoring levels1-4 (Grades 3-8) in English language arts 
(ELA) (NYC Charter School Center, 2014). 
 
Figure 5: Percentage of entering teachers in NYC drawn from bottom, middle and top thirds 
of state-wide score distribution (on national SATs) (Lankford et al., 2014, p. 28). 
Figure 6: Key education stakeholders in NYC and reforms. 
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 SSC students (outcome %) Control group counterparts 
(in other district-run schools) 
(outcome %) 
Graduated from local high 
school 
70.4 60.9 
English Regents exam score 
of 75 or above 
40.2 33.4 
Maths A Regents exam score 
of 75 or above 
24.6 24.7 
Table 1: Estimated effects of SSCs on 4-year high school graduation and college readiness 
(graduation rates 2009-2011; exam scores 2005-2011) (Bloom & Unterman, 2013, p. 8). 
 Percentage of students in 
special education 
Percentage of students in 
poverty 
District-run schools 14 82 
Chart schools 14 81 
Table 2: Comparison of student intakes, NYC (CREDO, 2015, p. 7). 
 
